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Abstract
We analyze optimal monetary policy in a small open economy characterized by home bias in
consumption. Peculiar to our framework is the application of a Ramsey-type analysis to a model
of the recent open economy New Keynesian literature. We show that home bias in consumption
is a su¢ cient condition for inducing monetary policy-makers of an open economy to deviate from
a strategy of strict markup stabilization and contemplate some (optimal) degree of exchange
rate stabilization. We focus on the optimal setting of policy both in the case in which ￿rms
set prices one period in advance as well as in the case in which ￿rms set prices in a dynamic
forward-looking fashion. While the ￿rst setup allows us to analytically highlight home bias
as an independent source of equilibrium markup variability, the second setup allows to study
the e⁄ects of future expectations on the optimal policy problem and the e⁄ect of home bias on
optimal in￿ ation volatility. The latter, in particular, is shown to be related to the degree of trade
openness in a U-shaped fashion, whereas exchange rate volatility is monotonically decreasing in
openness.
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The issue of whether exchange rate stabilization should be part of a central bank￿ s monetary
policy strategy, and more generally of whether the optimal setting of policy in an open economy
bears fundamental di⁄erences with respect to a closed economy, are at the heart of the recent
developments of the open economy New Keynesian literature.1
This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a small open economy characterized by home
bias in consumption. In our context, the presence of home bias is the key factor generating endoge-
nous real exchange rate ￿ uctuations. Hence, despite the fact that, in the absence of any impediment
to trade, the law of one price holds continually at the level of each individual good, equilibrium
deviations from PPP are feasible. In addition, our economy features goods markets characterized
by imperfect competition and nominal rigidities, and complete markets for internationally traded
state contingent securities.
We do not attempt to provide a theory of home bias in this context, but rather we model
it as a primitive feature of our economic environment. Importantly, the presence of home bias in
consumption is a fundamental characteristic of international trade data. For instance, Obstfeld
and Rogo⁄(2003) list home bias in trade as one of the six major puzzles in international macroeco-
nomics. Our interest here is in studying the e⁄ects of home bias on the optimal setting of monetary
and exchange rate policy.
We study monetary policy both in the case in which ￿rms set prices one period in advance
as well as in the case in which prices are set in a forward-looking fashion. While the former
static setup permits an analytical inspection of the main forces that drive the behavior of markups
under the optimal policy, the latter setup (intrinsically dynamic) allows to study the impact of
future expectations on the optimal policy problem and in particular on the equilibrium volatility
of in￿ ation.
Our analysis makes two main contributions. First, we highlight that home bias in consumption
is an independent condition inducing monetary policy makers of an open economy to deviate from an
inward-looking strategy of strict markup stabilization, and thus contemplate some (optimal) degree
of exchange rate stabilization. This di⁄ers from the popular Friedman (1956) prescription, derived
for instance in Devereux and Engel (2003), according to which, in the presence of price stickiness,
1The so-called New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature has grown rapidly in the last few years. See for
instance Obsteld and Rogo⁄ (1996), Benigno and Benigno (2003), McCallum and Nelson (2000), Corsetti and Pesenti
(2001, 2003), Kollman (2002), Devereux and Engel (2003), Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2002), Pappa (2003).
1exchange rate movements should be instrumental to have the economy replicate the allocation under
purely ￿ exible prices. Intuitively, with price stickiness and in response to asymmetric shocks, the
planner of a small economy would like to engineer an optimal adjustment of the whole range of
relative prices that a⁄ect the consumer￿ s purchasing power. In the absence of home bias (i.e., with
PPP holding), this requires inducing terms of trade adjustments that allow to strike an optimal
balance between markup smoothing and preservation of households￿ purchasing power. Other
contributions (such as Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Sutherland (2002) and Benigno and Benigno
(2003)) have shown that this terms of trade motive for optimal markup variability depends on the
underlying speci￿cation of the utility function (e.g., it vanishes in the case of unitary intratemporal
trade elasticity). This paper suggests that, in the presence of home bias and even in the case in
which preferences may inhibit the terms of trade motive, a complementary real exchange motive
emerges in general to induce variable markups under the optimal allocation.
Our second contribution has a more methodological ￿ avor. We suggest that optimal monetary
policy in a small open economy can be usefully characterized by applying a Ramsey-type analy-
sis. In the classic approach to the study of optimal policy in dynamic economies (Ramsey (1927),
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), Lucas and Stokey (1983), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991)), and
in a typical public ￿nance spirit, a Ramsey planner maximizes household￿ s welfare subject to a
resource constraint, to the constraints describing the equilibrium in the private sector economy,
and via an explicit consideration of all the distortions that characterize both the long-run and the
cyclical behavior of the economy. Recently there has been a resurgence of interest for a Ramsey-
type approach in dynamic general equilibrium models with monopolistic competition and nominal
rigidities. Examples include, in the context of closed economy models, Adao et al. (2003), Khan,
King and Wolman (2003), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Siu (2004).2 However, most of the
welfare analysis of monetary policy in the recent literature builds on a linear-quadratic approxi-
mation approach in the spirit of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Woodford (2003) and Benigno
and Woodford (2004). A Ramsey-type approach has featured even more limited applications to
the recent growing literature of New Keynesian open economy models.3
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the economic environment.
2Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Siu (2004), in particular, analyze the more general issue of the optimal joint
determination of monetary and ￿scal policy.
3For an application of a Ramsey-type analysis in the context of a two-country model, see, under sticky prices,
Faia and Monacelli (2003), and, under ￿ exible prices, Arsenau (2004). For applications employing a so-called linear-
quadratic approach, see Benigno and Benigno (2004) and De Paoli (2004).
2Section 3 illustrates the details of the optimal monetary policy problem under preset prices. Section
4 extends the analysis to forward-looking price setting. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The world economy consists of two economic entities, a small economy and a rest of the world.
Preferences feature home bias in consumption. Each economy is populated by in￿nitely-lived
agents. The total measure of the world economy is normalized to unity, with Home and Foreign
having measure n and (1 ￿ n) respectively. To characterize the small economy case we resort to
a "limit-case" approach, as in Gal￿ and Monacelli (2002), Sutherland (2005), De Fiore and Liu
(2005) and De Paoli (2004). This consists in characterizing the domestic economy as small in size
relative to the rest of the world, whose equilibrium dynamics are akin to the one of a standard
closed economy.
2.1 Domestic Households
Consumption preferences in the Home economy are described by the following composite index of
domestic and imported bundles of goods:













where ￿ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, and ￿ ￿ (1￿n)￿
denotes the weight of imported goods in Home consumption basket. This weight depends on
(1 ￿ n), the relative size of Foreign, and on ￿, the degree of trade openness of Home. In an
analogous manner, preferences in Foreign can be described as:
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where ￿￿ ￿ n ￿￿ We assume home bias in consumption, which entails:
1 ￿ (1 ￿ n)￿ > n￿￿ (3)
Notice that in the symmetric case of ￿ = ￿￿ (and regardless of the relative size assumption), as
well as in the limiting case n ! 0, home bias requires ￿ < 1. The same argument holds exactly for
consumption preferences in Foreign.4
4Home bias in Foreign preferences requires
3Each consumption bundle CH;t and CF;t is composed of imperfectly substitutable varieties





































Optimal allocation of expenditure between domestic and foreign bundles yields:



















is the CPI index.
We assume, both within and across countries, the existence of complete markets for state-
contingent claims expressed in units of domestic currency. Let ht = fh0;::::htg denote the history
of events up to date t, where ht is the event realization at date t. The date 0 probability of observing
history ht is given by ￿(ht). The initial state h0 is given so that ￿(h0) = 1.









where E0 fg denotes the mathematical expectations operator conditional on h0 and Nt is labor




(1 ￿ ￿) > n(￿ ￿ ￿
￿)
which can be rewritten as (3).
















4its arguments. To insure their consumption pattern against random shocks at time t households
spend ￿t+1;t Bt+1 in nominal state contingent securities where ￿t;t+1 ￿ ￿(ht+1jht) is the period-t
price of a claim to one unit of currency in state ht+1 divided by the probability of occurrence of
that state. Each asset in the portfolio Bt+1 pays one unit of domestic currency at time t + 1 and
in state ht+1.
By considering the optimal expenditure conditions (4) and (5), the sequence of budget con-








where ￿t are government net transfers of domestic currency and ￿t(i) are the pro￿ts of monopolistic
￿rm i, whose shares are owned by the domestic residents.6 The representative household chooses
processes fCt; Ntg1
t=0 and bonds fBt+1g1
t=0 taking as given the set of processes fPt; Wt; ￿t+1;tg1
t=0
and the initial wealth B0 so as to maximize (7) subject to (8).













Et f￿t;t+j Bt+jg = 0 (11)
where Uj;t de￿nes the ￿rst order derivative of utility with respect to its argument j = C;N. Equa-
tion (9) equates the CPI-based real wage to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure. Equation (12) describes a set of optimality conditions for each possible state ht+1.
Optimality requires that the ￿rst order conditions (9), (10) and the no-Ponzi game condition (11)
are simultaneously satis￿ed.
Taking conditional expectations of equation (12) allows to de￿ne a gross nominal interest rate
(or return on the corresponding riskless one-period bond) as:











6Each domestic household owns an equal share of the domestic monopolistic ￿rms. We abstract from international
trade in shares.
5which is a familiar consumption Euler equation. Notice that, following large part of the recent
literature, we do not introduce money explicitly, but rather think of it as playing the role of
nominal unit of account.7
2.2 Law of One Price, Foreign Demand, Terms of Trade and the Real Exchange
Rate
We assume throughout that the law of one price holds, implying that PF;t(i) = Et P￿
F;t(i) for all
i 2 [0;1], where Et is the nominal exchange rate, i.e., the price of foreign currency in terms of home
currency, and P￿
F;t(i) is the price of foreign good i denominated in foreign currency. Notice that
the holding of the law of one price does not necessarily imply that PPP holds, unless we make the
further restrictive assumption of absence of home bias.



































while the real exchange rate is de￿ned as Qt ￿
EtP￿
t
Pt . The terms of trade can be related to the
CPI-PPI ratio as follows
Pt
PH;t








Notice that the terms of trade and the real exchange rate are linked through the following
expression:
7See Woodford (2003), chapter 3. Thus the present model may be viewed as approximating the limiting case of a
























1￿￿ ￿ g￿(St) (17)
with q
0
(St) > 0 and g￿0
(St) < 0.
2.3 Risk-Sharing
Under complete markets for state contingent assets, the e¢ ciency condition for bonds￿holdings by




































Equating (10) with (18) and iterating yields the following condition linking the real exchange














c;0 . In the following we assume that the initial distribution of wealth is im-
plemented in such a way that ￿ = 1. Equation (20) is a typical condition that emerges in the
presence of international asset markets where households engage in risk-sharing via the trading of
state contingent securities.8 .
8It is easy to show that if the risk-sharing trading of assets at time zero corresponds to the two agents equalizing
their respective intertemporal budget constraint, necessarily ￿ = 1 (see Devereux and Engel (2003), Faia and Monacelli
(2004)). As a consequence of complete markets, whether the same asset trading is undertaken at time zero or
sequentially is irrelevant for the speci￿cation of the equilibrium.
72.4 Production and Price Setting
Each monopolistic ￿rm i produces a homogenous good according to the production function:
Yt(i) = AtF(Nt(i)) (21)
where At is a labor productivity shifter (common across ￿rms) and F(￿) is a homogeneous function
with Fn;t ￿ @F







where MC denotes the nominal marginal cost. Notice that since households supply a homogenous
type of labor the nominal wage and the marginal cost are common across ￿rms.
We assume that prices are determined one period in advance. There is no international price
discrimination. Each producer chooses the same price PH;t(i) to satisfy local and foreign demand
and to maximize expected discounted nominal pro￿ts:








and (21), where Yt(i) is total demand for variety i and Yt is world aggregate demand. By using




















= F￿1 (PH;t(i);PH;t; At; Yt)) = Nt(i).























Notice that, in the case of linear technology Yt(i) = AtNt(i), we have h
0
(￿) = 1. In general,
















, writing the product wage as Wt
PH;t = Wt



















2.5 Symmetric Equilibrium in a Small Open Economy
Market clearing for domestic variety i must satisfy:











































In a symmetric equilibrium, each domestic producer charges the same price and produces the
same level of output, so that PH;t(i) = PH;t; Nt(i) = Nt and Yt(i) = Yt for all i.
Next, we restrict our attention to the limiting case of a small economy. This implies that the
relative size of Home is negligible relative to the rest of the world, i.e., n ! 0. In this case, Foreign
is an aggregate economy whose equilibrium dynamics is exogenous from the viewpoint of the small
economy and approximately closed to trade. Notice that this assumption further implies P￿
F;t = P￿
t ,






We further assume symmetric degree of home bias across countries, which requires ￿ = ￿￿.
Hence we can ￿nally write:








9Notice that in the particular case of absence of home bias, in which PPP holds at all times,
we have Ct = C￿
t and therefore Qt = 1 for all t. This implies St = g(St) for all t. In this case, the
market clearing condition (28) simpli￿es to:
Yt = g(St)￿ Ct (29)













Fn;t and ￿ ￿ "
"￿1 is the steady-state level of markup. Notice that in obtaining
(30) we have made used of the fact that PH;t is predetermined from the viewpoint of time t.




g(St) = ￿￿1 (31)
In other words, with ￿ exible prices, each ￿rm would optimally choose to replicate a constant
markup. Importantly, the open economy dimension explicitly a⁄ects the markup via the presence
of the relative price g(St), which is positively related to the terms of trade.
At this stage we can propose the following de￿nition of the competitive equilibrium in the
small economy:
De￿nition 1. For any given policy fRtg and processes fC￿
t , Atg, a competitive equilibrium
in the small economy with predetermined prices and home bias is a triple fCt, Nt, Stg solving (20),
(28) and (30).
This de￿nition of the equilibrium allows to determine the remaining set of relevant variables
residually. To start with, given Rt and Ct and an initial condition on P￿1, the Euler condition
(12) allows to determine Pt. Given St and therefore g(St), we can pin down the domestic producer
price level from PH;t = Pt
g(St). Given St, PH;t and the foreign price level P￿
t , we can ￿nally derive




103 Optimal Monetary Policy
Optimal policy is determined by a monetary authority that, under commitment, maximizes the
discounted sum of utility of the representative agent under the constraints that characterize the
competitive economy. As in the classical literature on optimal taxation (see Chari, Christiano
and Kehoe (1994)) or more recently in the monetary policy closed-economy analysis of Adao et
al. (2003) and Khan et al. (2003), the policy problem takes the form of a constrained allocation
problem, in which the government can be thought of choosing directly a feasible allocation subject
to those constraints that ensure the existence of instruments and prices which make the same
allocation consistent with optimality.
In our cashless economy, the minimal set of constraints that are relevant for the Ramsey
allocation problem are the ones described in De￿nition 1. Hence the optimal policy problem for the
small economy￿ s planner can be described as follows. Let￿ s de￿ne by ￿t’(ht), ￿t￿(ht￿1) and ￿t￿(ht)
the lagrange multipliers respectively on the feasibility constraint (28), the price implementability
constraint (30) and the risk sharing condition (20). Notice that the multiplier on constraint (30)
depends on the history of events up to period t ￿ 1 and is therefore time-invariant as of time t.
A constrained optimal allocation is de￿ned by the following problem:




























A peculiar feature of the optimal policy problem when preferences exhibit home bias is that
the risk-sharing condition is an explicit constraint of the planner￿ s problem. In the absence of
home bias, that constraint would collapse to the equalities Ct = C￿
t and St = g(St), and the policy
problem could be rewritten in terms of a less-constrained structure (see more below on this point).
First order conditions for Ct;St and Nt read respectively:
110 = Uc;t + ￿(ht￿1)
Ucc;t
g(St)
AtF(Nt) ￿ ’(ht)(1 ￿ ￿)g(St)￿ + ￿(ht)Ucc;tq(St) (33)






















+ ￿(Unn;t! (Nt) + Un;t!n;t)
￿
+ ’(ht)AtFn;t (35)
Our goal is to establish under what conditions replicating the ￿ exible price allocation coincides
with the constrained optimum. In particular, and recalling equation (31), this corresponds to
determining whether the planner problem can sustain the term ￿t ￿ ￿
Un;t
AtFn;tUc;tg(St) as a constant.
We proceed as follows. Multiplying and dividing (35) by
g(St)


















We can obtain an expression for ’(ht) from (33):
’(ht) =
Uc;t




(1 ￿ ￿)g(St)￿ (37)
Notice that the last term in (37) is zero if and only if ￿(ht) = 0. This corresponds to the particular
case in which the risk-sharing constraint (20) is not explicitly binding in the planner￿ s problem.




































12and ￿t ￿ ￿
Ucc;tCt
Uc;t . Notice that K￿;t = 1 in two cases: (i) closed economy (￿ = 0), or (ii) PPP
holding, which implies C￿
t = Ct and Qt = 1 for all t.
In general, the conditions for a constant markup allocation to coincide with the constrained
optimum are the same as the ones that guarantee that the right hand side of (38) is time invariant.
For the sake of comparability, and in order to isolate the impact of openness and home bias on the
nature of the optimal policy problem, it is convenient to restrict our attention to standard constant
elasticity preferences. Hence, in the following, we assume ￿n;t = ￿n and ￿t ￿ ￿, where ￿n and ￿
are both constant. Let us also assume that the function F(￿) speci￿es to:
F(Nt) = N
￿
t ￿ ￿ 1
Hence, ! (Nt) = Nt
￿ and !n;t = 1
￿. This is the case for which Adao et al. (2003) - in the context of a
closed economy with predetermined prices - show that the constant markup allocation is consistent
with the constrained optimum.9
















￿ (1 + ￿n)
(40)
Thus, in particular, it is easy to see that in a closed economy the above expression reduces to
￿t =
￿(ht￿1)(1 ￿ ￿) + 1
1 + ￿(ht￿1)
￿
￿ (1 + ￿n)
(41)
which follows from g(St) = 1 and ￿(ht) = 0 for all t. The latter feature, in particular, follows
from the fact that in an economy closed to trade (both in assets and goods) the cross-country
risk-sharing condition cannot be a constraint in the policy problem.
In an open economy (￿ > 0), and under the maintained assumption of isoelastic preferences,
equation (40) identi￿es two independent sources of optimal deviations from the constant markup
allocation. First, movements in the terms of trade St. Second, movements in the real exchange
rate Qt (and therefore in K￿;t). Importantly, while variability in the real exchange rate implies
variability in the terms of trade, the reverse does not hold in general.
9Adao et al.(2003) emphasize, however, the non-generality of the constant markup result in the presence of variable
expenditure components (such as government purchases) and/or some form of non-isoelastic preferences. To bias our
results more in favor of price stability, we have abstracted from the presence of government expenditure shocks.
13To better understand the contribution of these two factors to the deviation from a constant
markup policy, it is instructive to study the particular case of PPP (absence of home bias), which
implies that the movements in the real exchange rate cannot be a source of markup variability in
the e¢ cient allocation.
3.1 PPP: a Particular Case
Recall that, under PPP, the market clearing condition reduces to (29). In addition, the constraint
(20) is not present in the planner￿ s problem. Hence the optimal policy problem reduces to
























+ ￿(Unn;t! (Nt) + Un;t!n;t)
￿
= ￿’(ht) AtF(Nt) (44)
Rearranging these conditions in a similar fashion to above, and once again assuming isoelastic
preferences, the expression for ￿t reduces to:
￿t =
￿(ht￿1)(1 ￿ ￿) + g(St)1￿￿
1 + ￿(ht￿1)
￿
￿ (1 + ￿n)
(45)
Hence we see that, in the case of isoelastic preferences, a constant ￿t can be consistent with the
constrained optimum only if g(St)1￿￿ is a term independent of shocks. This can be achieved either in
the case of cross-country perfectly correlated shocks (which do not require relative price adjustments
across countries, so that St = 1 for all t) or in the case of unitary elasticity of substitution ￿ = 1,
which implies Cobb-Douglas consumption preferences. In a more general case, in which ￿ 6= 1,
the constant markup allocation is never consistent with optimality. Under the optimal allocation,
a productivity shock requiring a terms of trade depreciation will induce a fall (rise) in ￿t, and
therefore a fall (rise) in the price level, whenever ￿ < (>) 1. The PPP case illustrated above is
akin to the two-country case analyzed by Benigno and Benigno (2003).
143.2 Forward-Looking Pricing
So far we have assumed that prices are preset one period. However, the most recent literature
on the analysis of optimal policy typically embeds forward-looking forms of price setting in the
standard New Keynesian framework.
We assume that changing output prices is subject to some costs. We follow Rotemberg (1982)










where the parameter # measures the degree of price stickiness. The higher # the more sluggish is
the adjustment of nominal prices. If # = 0; prices are ￿ exible.
The cost of price adjustment renders the domestic producer￿ s pricing problem dynamic. Each


















subject to (21) and (23).
In (47), ￿0;t is the time-zero price of one unit of domestic currency to be delivered in time t.








































Dividing through by ￿0;t and imposing a symmetric equilibrium (which implies PH;t(i) = PH;t
for all i and t) we can rewrite:































equation has the form of a non-linear forward-looking New-Keynesian Phillips curve.10 Notice that
the openness dimension a⁄ects the form of the Phillips curve via movements in the terms of trade.




g(St+1) as well as the marginal
cost expression Wt
AtFn;t Ptg(St).
Substituting (9) and the symmetric equilibrium version of (21), which implies AtF(Nt(i)) =
AtF(Nt) for all i, we can write (49) in terms of real allocations only :




















Equation (50) is a modi￿ed Phillips curve equation suitable for the policy allocation problem
to be analyzed below. Notice that, as a consequence of forward-looking price setting, it is unfeasible
to eliminate in￿ ation in the minimal set of conditions that summarize the competitive equilibrium
and which must be part of the planner￿ s allocation problem.
To complete the set of restrictions that will be relevant for the optimal policy problem, notice
that the resource constraint will now comprise a price adjustment cost factor, and therefore will
read:








3.3 Optimal Monetary Policy with Forward-Looking Pricing
The presence of the forward-looking pricing condition (50) alters the form of the policy problem
in a fundamental way. Once again, we assume that planner in the small economy can resort to
commitment. Let￿ s de￿ne by f￿p;t;￿f;t;￿r;tg
1
t=0 a sequence of lagrange multipliers on constraints
(50), (51) and (20) respectively. The planner￿ s problem can now be characterized as follows:




10For a log-linear Phillips curve derived in the context of the so called Calvo-Yun model, see Woodford (2003a)















































As a result of the constraint (50) exhibiting future expectations of control variables, the max-
imization problem as spelled out in (52) is intrinsically non-recursive.11 As ￿rst emphasized in
Kydland and Prescott (1980), and then developed in Marcet and Marimon (1999), a formal way
to rewrite the same problem in a recursive stationary form is to enlarge the planner￿ s state space
with additional (pseudo) costate variables. In our particular case, the enlarged state space is sim-
ply composed by the vector (At; Zt) where Zt ￿ ￿p;t￿1. The lagged multiplier ￿p;t￿1 bears the
crucial meaning of tracking, along the dynamics, the value to the planner of committing to the
pre-announced policy plan.12
For any given process fC￿
t g, ￿rst order e¢ ciency conditions with respect to ￿H;t, Ct; St; Nt
for t > 0 read:
Uc;t
g(St)
(2￿H;t ￿ 1) (￿p;t ￿ ￿p;t￿1) = ￿f;t # (￿H;t ￿ 1) (53)
0 = Uc;t +
￿H;t (￿H;t ￿ 1)
g(St)


























11See Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978). As such the system does not satisfy per se the principle of
optimality, according to which the optimal decision at time t is a time invariant function only of a small set of state
variables.
12If one or more constraints featured expectations extending more than one period in the future, the set of costate






















where we recall that !(Nt) ￿
F(Nt)
Fn;t .
The system (53)-(56) is recursive in the state space (At;Zt) for t > 0. As in Khan et al.
(2003), to avoid a typical non-recursivity problem at time t = 0, we assume that the initial value
of the multiplier ￿p;￿1 is set at the steady-state value implicit in the system (53)-(56). We refer
to the steady-state version of equations (53)-(56) as the deterministic Ramsey steady state. We
proceed to analyze its properties below.
3.3.1 Ramsey Steady State
To determine the long-run in￿ ation rate associated to the optimal policy problem above, one needs
to solve the steady-state version of the set of e¢ ciency conditions (53)-(56).13 In that steady-state,
we have ￿p;t = ￿p;t￿1. Hence condition (53) immediately implies:
￿f # (￿H ￿ 1) = 0 (57)
Since ￿f > 0 (the resource constraint must hold with equality) and # > 0 (we are not imposing a
priori that the steady-state coincides with the ￿ exible price allocation), in turn (57) must imply
￿H = 1. Hence the Ramsey planner would like to generate an average (net) in￿ ation rate of zero.
The intuition for why the the long-run optimal in￿ ation rate is zero is simple. Under commitment,
the planner cannot resort to ex-post in￿ ation as a device for eliminating the ine¢ ciency related to
market power in the goods market. Hence the planner aims at choosing that rate of in￿ ation that
allows to minimize the cost of adjusting prices, and summarized by the quadratic term #
2 (￿H;t ￿ 1)
2.
One may wonder why the openness dimension does not apparently exert any in￿ uence on the
desired optimal long-run in￿ ation rate. In light of our analysis above, the desire of adjusting the
terms of trade and/or the real exchange rate (under home bias) has been shown to be a su¢ cient
motive for inducing the planner to deviate from choosing a constant markup allocation. However,
these considerations can drive the planner￿ s behavior only in the presence of equilibrium ￿ uctuations
13To develop an analogy with the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model, this amounts to computing the modi￿ed golden
rule steady state. This per se contrasts with the golden rule in￿ ation rate, which would correspond to the one that
maximizes households￿instantaneous utility under the requirement that the planner is constrained to choose only
among constant allocations. In dynamic economies with discounted utility the two concepts of long-run optimal policy
do not coincide. See King and Wolman (1999) and Khan et al. (2003) for a closed-economy analysis on this point.
See Faia and Monacelli (2004) for additional discussion in the context of a two-country model.
18around the same long-run steady state and induced by country-speci￿c shocks. It is only in the
presence of such shocks that variations in (international) relative prices are e¢ ciently calibrated
to implement the optimal allocation. In other words, under commitment, the planner cannot on
average resort to movements in in￿ ation to alter the relative purchasing power of domestic residents.
Thus, under commitment, the desire to in￿ uence the terms of trade and/or the real exchange rate
shapes the optimal policy behavior only outside the long-run steady state.
3.4 Dynamics under the Optimal Policy and the E⁄ect of Home Bias
In this section we study the equilibrium dynamics under the optimal policy in response to pro-
ductivity shocks. In particular, our goal is to assess the extent to which home bias a⁄ects the






t and the production technology to be Yt = AtNt. The time unit is meant
to be quarters. The discount factor ￿ is equal to 0:99. The degree of risk aversion ￿ is 1 (which
implies log-utility), the inverse elasticity of labor supply ￿ is equal to 3, which is a common value
in the real business cycle literature. As a benchmark, we set the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods ￿ equal to 1:5. The literature is largely polarized on the likely value of
this parameter. Obstfeld and Rogo⁄(2000) summarize the related micro empirical trade literature,
which suggests values in the range [8;10] (see also Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004)). The current
New Open Macroeconomics literature usually adopts much lower values, in the range [1;2]. Many
normative results in this literature hinge on the assumed value of this parameter.14
In order to parameterize the degree of price stickiness, we observe that, by log-linearizing
equation (50) around a zero-in￿ ation steady-state, we can obtain an elasticity of in￿ ation to real
marginal cost (normalized by the steady-state level of output)15 that takes the form "￿1
# . This
allows a direct comparison with empirical studies on the New Keynesian Phillips curve such as
Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2002) using a Calvo approach. In those studies, the slope
coe¢ cient of the log-linear Phillips curve can be expressed as
(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿ , where ￿ is the probability
of not resetting the price in any given period. For any given values of ", which entails a choice
on the steady-state level of the markup, we can thus build a mapping between the frequency of
price adjustment in the Calvo model 1
1￿￿ and the degree of price stickiness # in the Rotemberg
14See Pappa (2004), Sutherland (2004), Benigno and Benigno (2003).
15To produce a slope coe¢ cient directly comparable to the empirical literature on the New Keynesian Phillips curve
this elasticity needs to be normalized by the level of output when the price adjustment cost factor is not explicitly
proportional to output, as assumed here.
19setup. Traditionally, the sticky price literature has been considering a frequency of four quarters
as a realistic value. Recently, Bils and Klenow (2004) argue that the observed frequency of price
adjustment is much higher in the US, and in the order of two quarters. In their comprehensive
study on Europe (which includes small open economies such as Belgium and Spain), Angeloni et
al. (2005) ￿nd evidence of lower frequency of price adjustment, and in the order of four quarters.
Hence we parameterize 1
1￿￿ = 4, which implies ￿ = 0:75. Setting the elasticity " equal to 7:5,




As a benchmark, we set the share of foreign imported goods in the domestic consumption
basket (degree of openness) to a value of 0:4. However, we will conduct a series of sensitivity
experiments on the value of this parameter. Finally (log) productivity is assumed to follow an
autoregressive process:
log(At) = ￿a log(At￿1) + "a
t
where ￿a = 0:9 and "a
t is an i.i.d. shocks with standard deviation ￿" = 0:01.
Our solution strategy consists in generating a log-linear approximation of the Ramsey equilib-
rium conditions (53)-(56) around the deterministic Ramsey steady state.16
3.4.1 Responses to Productivity Shocks and the E⁄ect of Varying Openness
Figure 1 displays impulse responses of the domestic price level, nominal exchange rate, consumption
and real exchange rate to a one percent rise in Home productivity under the Ramsey policy. All
responses are compared for alternative values of the degree of openness ￿. Recall that, in our
framework, the limit case of absence of home bias corresponds to ￿ ! 1. This is a limit case in the
sense that, for ￿ approaching 1, the consumption basket of the small economy tends to coincide
with the one of the rest of world (which per se corresponds to a closed economy).
Our simulations are conducted under two assumptions. First, the intratemporal elasticity of
substitution ￿ is assumed equal 1. This assumption entails that the terms of trade motive for
domestic markup variability is (temporarily) shut-down. Second, monetary policy in the rest of the
world is assumed to be conducted in terms of strict in￿ ation targeting, so that ￿￿
F;t = 1 for all t.
16By applying perturbation methods employed in the Matlab routines of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (and available
at the website http://www.econ.duke.edu/~grohe), I also solved the Ramsey equilibrium conditions up to an ap-
proximation of order two. This is to eventually account for the observation in Chari et al. (1995) that log-linear
approximations of Ramsey systems may be inaccurate. Results were virtually unaltered.
20Thus the ￿gure is representative of the role that home bias (inverse degree of openness) plays
in the optimal setting of policy. In response to higher productivity, the equilibrium adjustment
requires an increase in the demand of domestic goods relative to foreign goods. This is achieved by
means of a terms of trade and real exchange rate depreciation (as well as via a depreciation of the
nominal exchange rate). Intuitively, the size of the response of the real exchange rate is decreasing
in ￿, for the limit case of ￿ = 1 corresponds to the one in which PPP holds. The required nominal
depreciation is also decreasing in ￿, but this e⁄ect does not tend to vanish when the environment
approaches the PPP case. In the PPP case, in fact, the equilibrium adjustment still requires a
depreciation of the terms of trade.
Importantly, and even in the case ￿ = 1, we observe that strict (producer) price stabilization
is not part of the optimal policy program. Furthermore, the magnitude of the response of the price
level is not monotonic in ￿. The largest response of the price level is obtained for intermediate
values of openness. The intuition for this result is simple. From the point of view of the optimal
markup policy, both limit cases of ￿ ! 0 (no trade openness) and ￿ ! 1 (PPP, or absence of home
bias) mimic the situation of a closed economy. In that particular case, a large (and related) closed
economy literature has pointed out that the optimal policy prescription coincides with strict price
stabilization (Woodford (2003a), Clarida et al. (1999)).17
Notice also that the price level is stationary under the Ramsey allocation. This is reminiscent
of the history dependence feature of optimal policy emphasized in the same recent closed economy
literature.18 In turn, stationarity of the price level, coupled with stationarity in the terms of trade
(which is a feature of this economy under complete markets), generates the mean reverting behavior
of the nominal exchange rate.
Figure 2 displays the e⁄ects of varying ￿ on the equilibrium responses to a productivity shock
in the case ￿ = 2. Notice that in this case it is not only the real exchange rate response to be
a⁄ected by alternative values of openness, but also the response of the nominal exchange rate (and
of the terms of trade). As openness increases, the optimal policy prescribes enhanced smoothing
of the nominal exchange rate. Intuitively, since higher values of ￿ correspond to smaller degrees of
17However, Adao et al. (2003) re￿ne this proposition in the closed economy case. They show that the strict markup
stabilization result popularized, among others, by the work of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Woodford (2003a),
Clarida et al. (1999), Khan et al. (2003), does not generalize to all types of utility functions and ceases to hold in
the presence, for instance, of variable government expenditure.
18See Woodford (2003b).
21home bias, the real exchange motive for nominal exchange rate adjustment is dampened relative
to the necessity of inducing an adjustment in the terms of trade. Once again, a stronger response
of the price level is obtained in the intermediate case of openness.
The latter result motivates further simulation analysis whose output is displayed in Figure 3.
The ￿gure displays the e⁄ects of varying openness on the volatility of in￿ ation, the terms of trade
and the real exchange rate under the optimal policy. All values are expressed in percent terms. In
this case we assume that the only source of shocks is domestic productivity and maintain a value
of ￿ = 2. Hence we see that, in line with our impulse response results, optimal in￿ ation volatility
is U-shaped in the degree of trade openness. On the other hand, the volatility of the real exchange
rate and of the terms of trade is monotonically decreasing in ￿.
In Figure 4 we extend the set of shocks to include a foreign output shock. Hence we assume
that Y ￿
t = C￿
t = ￿￿Y ￿
t￿1 +"￿
t, with ￿￿ = 0:9, and ￿"￿
t = 0:01. Notice that optimal in￿ ation volatility
increases, although, at the peak, it remains quite low. On the other hand, for a su¢ ciently high
degree of home bias, the volatility of the real exchange rate and of terms of trade becomes sizeable
and in the order of ￿ve percent. Thus we see that, under the optimal policy, high home bias can
be a potentially vigorous source of nominal and real exchange rate volatility.
4 Conclusions
An important strand of the recent open economy New Keynesian literature has focused on the issue
of optimal monetary and exchange rate policy. However, these contributions have remained largely
disconnected from the traditional Ramsey-type approach that has been peculiar to the optimal
monetary and ￿scal policy literature of closed economy ￿ exible-price models.
This paper characterizes optimal monetary policy in a small open economy with nominal
rigidities and home bias in trade. Speci￿c to our approach is a Ramsey-type analysis of the optimal
policy problem. In this context, home bias in consumption emerges as an independent factor
contributing to deviations from the typical closed-economy paradigm of strict markup stabilization.
In this respect, and given that home bias is a prominent feature of international trade data, the
nature of optimal monetary policy in an open economy emerges as fundamentally di⁄erent from
the one of a closed economy.
Our analysis lends itself to several possible extensions. First, and within the same Ramsey-
type approach, one may explore the role of alternative sources of real exchange rate volatility,
22such as deviations from the law of one price induced either by stickiness in import prices or by
the presence of distributions costs (Burstein et al. (2003), Corsetti and Dedola (2004). Second,
one may observe that home bias is a fundamental feature of international trade data not only in
consumption but also in equities (Engel and Matsumoto (2005)). The extension of our setup to
the analysis of optimal exchange rate policy with a simultaneous presence of home bias in goods
and equities is an interesting avenue of research which we are exploring in ongoing complementary
work.
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Figure 1. Responses to a Productivity Shock under Ramsey Policy (ETA=1)















































Figure 2. Responses to a Productivity Shock under Ramsey Policy (ETA=2)

































































Figure 3. Volatility under Ramsey Policy: Effect of Varying Openness (domestic shocks)












































































Figure 4. Volatility under Ramsey Policy: Effect of Varying Openness (dom. and for. shocks)
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